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John Dewey 
Aesthetic Experience and Artful Conduct 
Kenneth A. McClelland 
  But it was not a choice 
Between excluding things. It was not a choice 
 
Between, but of. He chose to include the things 
That in each other are included, the whole, 
The complicate, the amassing harmony. 
   —Wallace Stevens1 
Dewey’s writings on art and aesthetics have, since the time of their publication, 
received somewhat modest attention in comparison to the coverage given other 
important areas of his philosophy. In recent years, however, there has been a 
gradual recognition that Dewey’s writings on art and aesthetics, written later in 
his career, exhibit a deeper and more comprehensive synthesizing of the major 
themes that had been developing throughout his entire philosophy.
2
 Failure to 
come to terms with Dewey’s writings on art and aesthetics is, in many ways, a 
failure to come to fuller terms with the deeper implications of his entire philoso-
phy. It is my contention, therefore, that Dewey’s writings on art and aesthetics 
provide the most thoroughgoing and mature rendering of the major themes that 
preoccupied his entire philosophical project. Experience is the major theme run-
ning throughout Dewey’s work, and it is my focus here. The many aspects of his 
philosophical project are difficult to grasp unless his reconstruction of experi-
ence is understood. Attempting to overcome the gulf between theory and prac-
tice begun in Greek philosophy and continued throughout much of the history 
of Western philosophy, Dewey comes to this bold conclusion in chapter 9 of Ex-
perience and Nature:  
But if modern tendencies are justified in putting art and creation first, 
then the implications of this position should be avowed and carried 
through. It would then be seen that science is an art, that art is practice, 
and that the only distinction worth drawing is not between practice and 
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theory, but between those modes of practice that are not intelligent, not 
inherently and immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of en-
joyed meanings. When this perception dawns, it will be a commonplace 
that art—the mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of 
immediately enjoyed possession—is the complete culmination of nature, 
and that “science” is properly a handmaiden that conducts natural events 
to this happy issue. Thus would disappear the separations that trouble 
present thinking: division of everything into nature and experience, of 
experience into practice and theory, art and science, of art into useful 
and fine, menial and free.3 
No doubt, this passage still sounds radical today. A cursory look at how and why 
it is radical is the intention behind this paper. 
Art and the Commons 
In his writings on art and aesthetics, Dewey seeks to bring art back into the fold 
of the sociocultural and the sociotemporal, making aesthetic experience less elite 
and escapist and more applicable to everyday life experiences. The origin and 
destiny of aesthetic experience and artistic works is, for Dewey, the commons. 
The task, for Dewey, “is to restore continuity between the refined and intensified 
forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, suffer-
ings that are universally recognized to constitute experience.”
4
 It is not Dewey’s 
intention that everybody will, upon following this road, rise to the level of fine 
artist (he has room for the unique qualities, insights, and even the genius of par-
ticular artists and their work). He is saying, however, that the creative process 
and expressive potential so vividly expressed in fine works of art—the complex 
movement from some vision (end-in-view) through that vision’s manipulation 
in production toward an aesthetic outcome (consummation)—is a process ex-
emplary of how we intelligently experience and shape our world.  
We all have an ongoing aesthetic hunger. This hunger is not easily dimin-
ished by faulty personal and social bearings. Understanding that experience’s 
embodied movement in time constitutes us as the shapers of our world, and that 
our world is a canvas of unlimited possibility, we may begin to appreciate more 
fully the aesthetic possibilities of an ameliorative stance to the day-to-day prob-
lems we face. For when that which is considered cultivated or refined is also re-
mote and disconnected from common life, then “esthetic hunger is likely to seek 
the cheap and the vulgar.”
5
 When this occurs experience is degraded, and the 
problems of our world are left to whim and chance or, conversely, fanaticism 
and tyranny.  
It is, therefore, no mere coincidence that Dewey’s most mature work deals 
with art and aesthetics. It is there that he found the subject matter most amena-
ble to the deepest implications of his own democratic vision. Art as Experience is 
the strongest title he gave to any work. Art, when aesthetically charged, is repre-
sentative of “experience in its integrity.”
6
 As Dewey says: 
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Had not the term “pure” been so often abused in philosophic literature, 
had it not been so often employed to suggest that there is something al-
loyed, impure, in the very nature of experience and to denote something 
beyond experience, we might say that esthetic experience is pure experi-
ence. For it is experience freed from the forces that impede and confuse 
its development as experience; freed, that is, from factors that subordi-
nate an experience as it is directly had to something beyond itself. To es-
thetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what ex-
perience is.
7 
Dewey’s point is a particularly modernist one—artful conduct as leading 
to aesthetic experience is representative primarily of the kind of beings we are 
potentially in the world as well as the kind of world we are beings in. The organic 
relation between humans and their environment is a transactional affair, and one 
in which both become equally productive in manifesting the ongoing struggle to 
endow our world with meaning and value. This begins at an immediate or felt 
level, and art, at its best, demonstrates this pervasive organicism when it culmi-
nates to a level of aesthetic experience, aesthetic experience representing the full-
ness of experience. It represents a culmination or a consummatory phase in 
which the organism finds a new posture toward the world, helping to fortify the 
aesthetic against the anaesthetic. 
As a way of deepening my own analysis I now turn to Dewey’s use of the 
terms “pervasive quality” and “situation.” Understanding these terms as he ap-
plies them is fundamental to arriving at a less myopic and more complex under-
standing of what Dewey means by aesthetic experience. 
Qualitative Situations  
Amidst our “undergoing” and “doing” in day-to-day life our thinking seems to 
have become severed from the more qualitative dimensions of our experience, 
what Kaufman-Osborn calls the “pragmata”
8
 of our lifeworld, and thus what we 
undergo and do tends to be aimless, disconnected, and arbitrary. Rather than by 
any real relation of undergoing and doing from some felt and embodied connec-
tion to primary experience, we are tugged and pulled by bloodless abstractions 
which step in with false promises of meaning and fulfillment.  
Central to Dewey’s theory of art and aesthetic experience is his thinking on 
pervasive quality. Without an understanding of pervasive quality as the funda-
mental feature of any experience, consummatory experience or an experience, as 
Dewey alternately calls it, is not properly intelligible. Pervasive quality is a very 
difficult concept to tease out, because its ineffable features are not easily amena-
ble to description. For any description or attempt at definition is already a step 
removed from the essential “isness” of qualitative experience. One might wonder, 
then, if we can say anything at all about the pervasive quality of any given experi-
ence. Well, in a sense, we cannot. We cannot, that is, say anything of its immedi-
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acy, for its immediacy is something had or felt, wholly pre-reflective and thus 
pre-discursive. It is that quality of immediate experience which is irreducible and 
indescribable. Yet, if this were the be-all-and-end-all of experience, we would 
find ourselves in no vital connection to our environment, receiving no more 
than a meaningless barrage of sensory impressions. We can and inevitably must 
say something out of the pervasive quality that flows in and through experience, 
but what we say is a reflection of how we have defined, discriminated, and situ-
ated ourselves in relation to any particular experience. Language mediates our 
experience, but the way in which we situate ourselves can be productive of a 
deeper connection to life-experience or it can remain merely surface and thus 
stunted. We must be careful not to conflate what we come to know about an ex-
perience with the experience in its immediacy. When we do this we diminish that 
experience, the qualitative dimensions of which fundamentally shape and give 
logical force to our knowledge as an achievement.  
It is this problem that has plagued much of modern philosophy, and its 
most prominent manifestation is to be found in modern science. There has been 
the tendency to ignore or reduce to soft irrelevancy the qualitative dimensions of 
experience. In this, philosophers and scientists have insisted on a fundamental 
split between subject and object, wherein the subjective mind somehow has ac-
cess to a correspondent knowledge of a wholly independent realm of epistemic 
objects. They have equated, in other words, knowledge of the experience with the 
experience itself, and have thus confused having an experience with knowing it. 
With Dewey’s more inclusive understanding of experience, he writes:  
Many modern thinkers, influenced by the notion that knowledge is the 
only mode of experience that grasps things, assuming the ubiquity of 
cognition, and noting that immediacy or qualitative existence has no 
place in authentic science, have asserted that qualities are always and 
only states of consciousness. It is a reasonable belief that there would be 
no such thing as “consciousness” if events did not have a phase of brute 
and unconditioned “isness,” of being just what they irreducibly are. . . . 
And also without immediate qualities those relations with which science 
deals would have no footing in existence, and thought would have noth-
ing beyond itself to chew upon or dig into. Without a basis in qualitative 
events, the characteristic subject-matter of knowledge would be algebraic 
ghosts, relations that do not relate.
9
  
Immediate experience, then, is a quality that inheres neither exclusively in 
external objects nor exclusively in the contemplating mind of isolated subjects. It 
is rather the experience as “felt” or “had” by way of our transaction with the en-
vironment. Saying that there is an immediate quality within experience is not to 
undermine the possibility or relevance of any kind of mediation. At this point I 
wish only to emphasize that the pervasive quality of any given experience, as it is 
felt or had, represents the initial phase of absorption between the organism and 
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its environment. This is the primary phase of experience. The context of the ini-
tial or primary phase is non-cognitive and it is controlling. This ineffable and 
controlling quality of the context is anticipated in the introduction to Essays in 
Experimental Logic. There Dewey tells us that the non-cognitive quality of the 
context is “the vast, vague continuum . . . this taken-for-granted whole.” As he 
goes on to add, “The word ‘experience’ is . . . a notation of an inexpressible as 
that which decides the ultimate status of all which is expressed; inexpressible not 
because it is so remote and transcendent, but because it is so immediately en-
grossing and matter of course.”
10
 The organism is caught up in the immediate 




This active and dynamic field of participation is what Dewey calls a “situa-
tion” or its “context.” The immediate existence of quality is entirely prereflective, 
but importantly it “is the background, the point of departure, the regulative prin-
ciple of all thinking.”
12
 It is the pervasive quality that defines and unifies each 
situation as that unique situation. As Dewey writes: 
An experience has a unity that gives it its name, that meal, that storm, 
that rupture of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted by a 
single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation 
of its constituent parts. This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor in-
tellectual, for these terms name distinctions that reflection can make 




Each unique situation is made up of both primary and secondary qualities, but 
the primary fused quality that makes the situation that particular situation is 
what originally binds the organism to its surrounding environment. The organ-
ism has not as yet reflected upon the situation, but is in the position to do so, as 
the primary situation is the necessary and controlling guide to reflection, also re-
ferred to as the secondary phase of experience.  
We begin to sense, then, the rhythm within experience as any given experi-
ence moves through its successive, but wholly interdependent phases. Dewey 
here envisions a more organic reintegration of the primary and secondary phases 
of experience, in which he attacks the absolutist epistemology of traditional phi-
losophic inquiry that has unfortunately turned the primary and secondary di-
mensions of experience into an irreconcilable dualism. It is these epistemological 
absolutes that have little room for the ineffable rhythm and quality of day-to-day 
life, which, we must remember, represents the primary source for drawing epis-
temological conclusions to begin with. When the primary dimensions of experi-
ence are denied or ignored, lived experience becomes stunted, not quite whole. 
We wittingly or unwittingly fail to take experience in its complex fullness when 
our knowledge and actions, reflective outcomes from the pool of pre-reflective 
primary experience, fail to get referred back to that primary ground for testing. 
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Conclusions or ends that fail to return to the primary qualitative ground of ex-
perience for testing remain the conclusions of a non-empirical mode of analysis. 
The potentially more empirical outcomes of organic secondary reflection are 
thus cut short in the name of indubitable truth, and the sterile dualism between 
primary and secondary experience is reinforced. The possibility of grounded in-
telligent action is checked by the over-arching desire for absolute epistemological 
certainty. Those who hunger after indubitable epistemic certainty neglect the 
recognition that “the situation controls the terms of thought; for they are its dis-
tinctions, and applicability to it is the ultimate test of their validity.”
14
 The pri-
mary qualitative situation, Dewey goes so far as to say, is the very condition of 
our sanity: 
The undefined pervasive quality of an experience is that which binds to-
gether all the defined elements, the objects of which we are focally aware, 
making them whole. The best evidence that such is the case is our con-
stant sense of things as belonging or not belonging, of relevancy, a sense 
which is immediate. It cannot be a product of reflection, even though it 
requires reflection to find out whether some particular consideration is 
pertinent to what we are doing or thinking. For unless the sense were 
immediate, we should have no guide to our reflection. The sense of an 
extensive and underlying whole is the context of every experience and it 
is the essence of sanity.15 
Potentially artful conduct, therefore, inheres in the organic and dynamic move-
ment of experience as it passes through various phases toward consummation, 
toward something that can properly be called a fully embodied experience. What 
carries us through these various phases might properly be called the materials of 
our experience.  
The Materials of Artful Conduct: Habit, Sense, and Imagination 
Every situation inheres in a degree of precognitive meaningfulness, and this 
meaningfulness is, as Kaufman-Osborn puts it, the result of “accustomed patterns 
of culturally transmitted interpretive response, of habits that emerge out of the 
noncognitive intercourse between agents and the world in which they are heirs.”
16
  
Every artist uses materials. We typically think of them as brush, paint, and 
canvas, or as instruments to be played upon, or as marble to be sculpted; but 
when experience itself is conceived as art then we need to be aware of alternative 
materials of a more psychological and phenomenological nature. For the trans-
action between organism and environment that issues experience forward in 
more or less refined ways depends on drawing from those materials of habit, 
sense, and imagination. My focus here is not intended to be exhaustive, of course, 
but these three materials, as I am calling them, are nonetheless centrally impor-
tant. This, of course, is not intended as an exhaustive list of the so-called materi-
als of experience, but they are some of the centrally important ones. Through 
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them we may come closer to grasping something of the consummatory power of 
aesthetic experience, for if our movement in the world (conduct) can inhere 
through higher degrees of artfulness, then the aesthetic achievements that come 
on the heels of art give heightened meaning and value to that movement. 
Often we hear the claim that we are creatures of habit. But how often do 
we stop to think about what this means? Of course, stopping and thinking about 
habits, in many situations, is entirely counter-productive. Habits, under most 
stable conditions, embody the pervasive quality that infuses situations, and as 
such are part of the taken-for-granted whole that we feel as this or that particular 
situation. Habits exercise a certain mechanical power in our lives precisely be-
cause, under a great many conditions, we do not have to think about them. “If 
each act has to be consciously searched for at the moment and intentionally per-
formed, execution is painful and the product is clumsy and halting.”
17
  
In other words, our habits are not self-consciously realized nor are they in-
tellectually scrutinized. Rather, habits form the background of a situation, pro-
viding the taken-for-granted field of meanings, “serving not as external means of 
identification, but rather as atmospheric media whose entrance into the consti-
tution of every situation provides the ill-defined yet meaningful field upon which 
specific phenomena are brought before focal consciousness.”
18
 In his essay “Con-
text and Thought” Dewey draws the analogy of a picture or a painting in which 
the “spatial background covers all the contemporary setting within which a 
course of thinking emerges.” 
That which is looked into, consciously scrutinized, has, like a picture, a 
foreground, middle distance, and a background—and as in some paint-
ings the latter shades off into unlimited space. . . . This contextual setting 
is vague, but it is no mere fringe. It has a solidity and stability not found 
in the focal material of thinking. The latter denotes the part of the road 
upon which the spotlight is thrown. The spatial context is the ground 
through which the road runs and for the sake of which the road exists.19 
The habits that constitute the background, colour and saturate the foreground, 
providing the subconscious intelligibility of what is presently in conscious focus. 
It is part of the non-cognitive pervasive quality of the situation. Now, under con-
ventional, untroubled conditions these habits carry us smoothly along. We feel a 
sense of situatedness without necessarily “knowing” it, for habit, when untrou-
bled, “is too thoroughly implicated in its medium to survey or analyze it.”
20
 Hab-
its thus supply a spatio-temporal locational power that acts as precognitive 
guides to everyday experience. Kaufman-Osborn puts the point nicely when he 
states that 
in addition to furnishing a ground for the recognizability of conven-
tional phenomena within everyday life, habits are dynamic potentialities 
that are vitally present even when not immediately engaged. As pat-
terned dispositions to action whose incorporation of the past navigates 
John Dewey: Aesthetic Experience and Artful Conduct ♦ 51 
Volume 21(2) ♦ 2005 
each moment into the future and so insures that conduct’s unfolding in 
time is something other than a meaningless juxtaposition of isolated re-
actions to discrete situations, habits’ constellation constitutes our effec-
tive desires and furnishes us with our practical capacities. As such, the 
term “habit” does the work more often done by that of “will.”21 
The smooth flow of habits, under stable conditions, is powerful because it is 
through them that we come to in-habit our world. They are the effective back-
ground and mechanism of stable bearing and meaning in our lives. Yet, if life ex-
perience were perpetually stable, then all situations would be untroubled, and 
habit would be equated with a state of eternal constancy. 
Under such impossible conditions, habit as constancy would be continu-
ous with a state of either absolute inertia or perfect automatism and we would 
have reached the pinnacle of our growth. Its logical expression in human terms 
would be sleep or death, for being awake would be inconceivable, as there would 
no longer be any necessity to think. The very idea of experience and its aesthetic 
possibilities would thus also be inconceivable because of the absolute absence of 
tension. For it is only through tension that experience is propelled forward, that 
life moves.  
Although a great many of our habits have staying power, that is, their pro-
jective meaningfulness proves adequate to many of the untroubled situations of 
day-to-day living, nonetheless habits cannot prove indefinitely stable. Those 
habits that do achieve what we might call a working constancy have a very prac-
tical import. They offer sufficient inertia so that, if we are willing to take advan-
tage, we can engage in higher-order thinking. For we need to recognize that we 
are prone to habits of thinking, and these habits can be routine or they can be 
artful. It is important to emphasize that the habit-laden meaningfulness of any 
present untroubled situation is itself a result. It is the cumulative effect of some 
past occasion of thinking, some past tensional situation that has managed to lo-
cate a present stable bearing. Habit, if it is intelligently formed, is representative 
of a deep adjustment of the organism to its environment. This adjustment, if it is 
intelligently fashioned and adopted, might properly be deemed aesthetic. Master 
musicians often exhibit a fluid virtuosity in their playing wherein mechanical 
habit has become fused with thought and feeling. A masterful technician does 
not perform as a matter of mere automatism. To do so would make for a me-
chanical performance. If habits are intelligently formed, they are alive and flexi-
ble within the organism’s ongoing adjusting to the world. Habit is art when it 
embodies thought and feeling as its mode of adjustment. The opposite of habit 
thus conceived is not thought, but deadening routine. 
It is only at those moments of instability, when our habitual world threat-
ens to come apart, that we are incited to grow and develop: when we must think, 
take stock, and become conscious of our dynamic relation to the environment. It 
is at this point of tension that life incites us to potentially artful conduct, when 
we might become the crafters of a new stability. At this moment of tension, there 
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is a newly released impulse, insisting on some re-direction and re-qualification of 
old habit. Indeed this is when habit, previously not explicitly conscious, is ex-
posed as subject to temporal movement. We can refer to something as an old 
habit only because our movement in time has manifested a disruption or ten-
sional break that necessitates a new adjustment. Getting to a new point where a 
situation makes sense represents the crucial phase in the organism’s transaction 
with its environment, wherein the process of making sense can potentially be-
come aesthetically charged, making conscious experience itself more artful. This 
making sense is intelligence at work. 
“Sense” is a very important and rich term for Dewey. As he says, “‘sense’ 
covers a wide range of contents: the sensory, the sensational, the sensitive, the 
sensible, and the sentimental, along with the sensuous. . . . but sense, as meaning 
so directly embodied in experience as to be its own illuminated meaning, is the 
only signification that expresses the function of sense organs when they are car-
ried to full realization.”
22
 Sense, therefore, is integral to that experiential phase 
when the organism, having fallen out with its environment because of some ten-
sional rupture in the situation, begins to consciously focus on the relations that 
make up that situation. The organism, through tension, has come to a stage of 
reflection on and within the situation. It is important to note that this reflective 
phase of experience has its own quality, but it is different in kind from the origi-
nal pervasive quality that binds the organism to the primary objects of its envi-
ronment. This original quality is vague and indefinite, whereas sense via reflec-
tion has a recognized reference: “it is the qualitative characteristic of something, 
not just a submerged unidentified quality or tone.”
23
 What sense now picks out is 
the relation between the primary and secondary qualities of objects within the 
environment as the situation becomes consciously focused within the thinking 
subject.  
Dewey understands “sense” as an active/dynamic capacity wherein, as a fo-
cal point of consciousness, it both illuminates a situated moment and also opens 
the body to the world in exploratory and receptive intensity. As Dewey explains: 
“Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive, not a with-
holding of energy.”
24
 If we recall the analogy of a painting in “Context and 
Thought” we remember that a situational field has a foreground, a middle dis-
tance, and a background. It is the foreground in which we locate that part of the 
road that is illuminated by the shining light of sense. Yet, we remember also that 
the pervasive qualitative context is that through which the road runs and “for the 
sake of which the road exists.” Sense, therefore, signifies the organism’s embod-
ied movement in the light of a troubled situation, wherein the body itself be-
comes a lived meaning, moving in a spatial and temporal drama where body and 
mind become unified in heightened sensitivity to the possibilities of where the 
road might lead. In other words, if making sense is to result in some kind of aes-
thetic value, then imagination must be viewed as integral.  
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When an otherwise stable situation becomes tensional, when new impulses 
are released, old habits are immediately brought to conscious attention, new 
paths of action explored. This exploration is what deliberation is about. It is, as 
Dewey says, “a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possi-
ble lines of action.”
25
 Activity in this sense does not cease in order that reflection 
may take the fore. Rather, “activity is turned from execution into intra-organic 
channels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal.”
26
 Aspects of impulse and habit are put 
in various combinations, experimental trials so to speak, in order to determine 
what an action would be like if it were entered upon. Thinking at this point is 
wholly hypothetical. It is the safety mechanism of imaginative deliberation that 
“runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the in-
struction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its 
consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final 
or fatal. It is retrievable.”
27
 
The interpenetration of subject and object releases potential avenues of 
overt activity via the imagination. For even imaginative rehearsal achieves its 
content and meaning only when its activity involves a process of trying out vari-
ous avenues of potentially fruitful conduct: “In imagination as in fact we know a 
road only by what we see as we travel on it.”
28
 The subject, rehearsing the possi-
bilities of some future overt conduct, partakes of experience’s objects in imagina-
tion. Objects object to the movement, thus necessitating activity’s new direction, 
or they do not, thus providing activity’s point of rest. There is, essentially, no dif-
ference between this process as it occurs in the imagination and as it might take 
place in overt activity. It is equally dynamic and organic. The only thing that 
makes imaginative rehearsal more sensible is that the consequences of going 
down any chosen road are not overtly real, although they implicate any real 
choice that might be made as a result. When a choice is really made it is “not the 
emergence of preference out of indifference. It is the emergence of a unified pref-
erence out of competing preferences.”
29
 Choice comes at the moment when 
imagination envisions the objective consequence of an action and deems that 
consequence fruitful and just. Overt action is released. All deliberation therefore 
is a search for the best action, its “office is to facilitate stimulation.”
30
 If a choice 
be a reasonable choice, then the human subject travels a road of intelligent con-
duct, and experience is given new direction, new depth, and new meaning. 
This cognitive dynamic highlights the creative capacity of the human 
imagination. The quality of meaning and value in our lives is funded by our abil-
ity to imagine possibility. The radical import of Dewey’s aesthetic thinking is 
that imagined possibilities or ideals represent the capacity to mediate and im-
prove upon observed actualities. It is not a separate faculty that works independ-
ently of experience’s embodied temporal movement. The quality of working 
imagination is a universal quality of wholeness and unity, but that quality gets its 
life-energy from the local act, the observed and limited here and now. The tem-
poral drama enacted in imagination is a virtual expansion and refinement that 
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utilizes what is in order to manifest what might be. The observed here and now 
becomes stunted to the degree that the organism fails to recognize the universal 
quality of extension that impels the imagination’s ongoing relation to a vital pre-
sent, which is itself a manifestation of past experience. Imagination becomes 
pure fancy when it becomes disconnected from the energizing capacity of the 
here and now, forging for itself castles in the air. Imagination projects ideal pos-
sibilities and therefore reflects the creative and expanding capacity of human in-
telligence. It is in this sense that imagination provides the infusing stuff of aes-
thetic experience.  
The object of thought stimulates a unification and harmonization of com-
peting tendencies in which each competing tendency is reduced to a component 
in a reformed action exhibiting a transformed quality. Human conduct thus 
draws from a profound reservoir of preparatory competence. The competence of 
conduct’s unfolding in time is a matter of embodied deliberation leading to in-
telligent and humane outcomes. For Dewey it is a human wonder:  
Nothing is more extraordinary than the delicacy, promptness and inge-
nuity with which deliberation is capable of making eliminations and re-
combinations in projecting the course of a possible activity. To every 
shade of imagined circumstance there is a vibrating response; and to 
every complex situation a sensitiveness as to its integrity, a feeling of 
whether it does justice to all facts, or overrides some to the advantage of 
others. Decision is reasonable when deliberation is so conducted. There 
may be error in the result, but it comes from lack of data not from inep-
titude in handling them.31  
Reasonable conduct thus comes by way of a vital harmonization of competing 
desires (impulses, habits), and the age-old dualism between reason and desire 
collapses. Traditional philosophical thinking has pitted desire against reason, 
when in the light of artful conduct the fact is that they are tightly interrelated. 
Reason is, as Dewey maintains, “a quality of an effective relationship among de-
sires rather than a thing opposed to desire.”
32
 Reason, rather than being an ante-
cedent, bloodless abstraction, actually gains its vital energy through passion. De-
liberation’s science, its experimental mode, is at the same time deliberation’s art, 
as reason becomes fully implicated in the passionate phase of activity. Rationality 
is what remains when we make a reasonable choice, and choice is reasonable 
when it results in reasonable conduct. Rationality is the effect of complex proc-
esses that involve the thinking, feeling human subject. It is not, as traditionally 
understood, the antecedent base of all thought and feeling. This is a radical as-
pect of Dewey’s thinking and shows that the cultivation of intelligence is art. 
Art’s outcome, the result of conduct’s manifestation through cultivated intelli-
gence, is reason, and reason itself becomes the dynamic realization of experience’s 
consummatory potential. Life’s art is achieved through our embodied transaction 
with our environment in which both organism and environment coalesce in 
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crafting experience’s deeper possibilities. Artful conduct is the manifestation of 
experience in its integrity, and its outcome is properly called aesthetic. 
The dynamic relation, then, between past meaning (habit) and future ex-
pectation (imagination) is what gives direction to the present, gives it its sense. 
To the degree that the organism’s senses are alive to this transactive movement 
in time, the experience becomes one of “heightened vitality.” It is during such 
moments of “heightened vitality” that experience is consciously manifest, and to 
the extent that the experience becomes aesthetically charged, such represents the 
richer depths of meaning and value which are sensed within and through the ex-
perience. At this point an experience becomes truly consummatory. Temporal 
quality pervades every situation and sense lights its way. Heightened sensitivity is 
sensitivity to the relational meanings consciously becoming manifest within a 
moving situation, wherein the original, pervasive, felt quality becomes enriched 
by and infuses the consciousness of temporal movement. As Stuhr points out, 
“the quality is active and regulative—that is, intrinsically inclusive of its future 
transformation or negation.”
33
 As a situation is transformed from a state of dis-
equilibrium into one of equilibrium, where the organism intelligently develops a 
new posture to the world, it is the original state of disequilibrium (a problematic 
or tensional situation) that is both the quality condition and the quality control 
of the situation’s movement toward consummatory close. It is through tension 
and resistance, then, that we come to sense life’s quality and rhythm, that we get a 
“feel” for life. As Dewey says: “Friction is as necessary to generate esthetic energy 
as it is to supply the energy that drives machinery.”
34
 Rather than mere intellec-
tual relations, life’s qualitative dimensions give consummatory moments their 
poignancy, and make possible the aesthetic within experience. As Dewey states: 
That which distinguishes an experience as esthetic is conversion of resis-
tance and tensions, of excitations that in themselves are temptations to 
diversion, into a movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close.35 
Art Works 
In determining why art is important to life, it is no understatement to consider 
with Dewey that art, to a great degree, is life. Our temporal and embodied trans-
actions with and within our environment may not, under a great many social 
and cultural conditions, manifest art’s potential, but this is not an inevitable and 
inherent condition of our living in the world. Social and cultural conditions 
press externally on individual experience, and to the degree that these external 
pressures emanate from some vital connection to the conditions of their own de-
velopment, so the potential baseness or fineness of what experience might be-
come hangs in the balance. 
What I have attempted to show thus far is that art is “prefigured in the 
very processes of living.”
36
 Art signifies our capacity to grow and develop, and 
growth and development are what occurs in any medium of tension and recov-
56 ♦ Kenneth A. McClelland 
E&C ♦ Education and Culture 
ery. The human organism is born and its subsequent growth and development is 
the accumulating result of its transactions with its surroundings. As with the in-
dividual, so too are social and cultural developments the accumulating result of 
transactions between organism and environment. In capturing something of the 
“psychology” of artful conduct—the potentially artful movement of habit, sense, 
and imagination—I have attempted to convey the complexity of our embodied 
status within our environment and within time. I have attempted to capture 
something of the depth implicit in this statement by Dewey: “Art celebrates with 
peculiar intensity the moments in which the past re-enforces the present and in 
which the future is a quickening of what now is.”
37
 Art works much like the hu-
man organism works in its daily doings and undergoings. Whether art’s working 
manifests what can justifiably be called a work of art, that is, something exhibit-
ing aesthetic, consummatory, and expressive refinement, depends on the degree 
to which art’s working arises from an enhancement of experience as it is lived in 
connection with its surroundings. In this sense if art is not working it is merely a 
product, static and dumb. 
As I have been suggesting, we need to look at the word “works” not as a 
noun, but rather as a verb. For art is a working movement, and its culmination 
in an aesthetically charged work does not bring art’s working to a close. If the fi-
nal work is something having depth and substance, then it will continue to work 
within the community. The substance of a work of art is to be found in what it 
communicates within a community. If an artwork exhibits fineness of form, then 
we have determined something of how the work communicates within a com-
munity. Completion of a work by an artist is like a new birth within the commu-
nity as that work is dependent on ongoing communal engagement for its sur-
vival. It becomes expressive, and its continued expressiveness is the sign of its 
continued constructive possibility, its continued working.  
Art is simply a refined expression or language exhibiting experience’s aes-
thetic capacity, manifesting our temporal movement as being capable of greater 
depths of meaning. This profounder wellspring of meaning implicates human 
beings in a world of ongoing potential development in which we partake of our 
material surroundings and in doing so extend our expressive nature in socially 
significant and meaningful ways. As Dewey says: 
The material out of which a work of art is composed belongs to the com-
mon world rather than to the self, and yet there is self-expression in art 
because the self assimilates that material in a distinctive way to reissue it 
into the public world in a form that builds a new object.38  
The artwork fails to communicate something new, or, for that matter, anything 
at all, when it is consigned to a collector’s vault where, at most, it can be only po-
tentially expressive. 
Although art museums are considered “public” venues, Dewey tends to 
view them more as public mausoleums. The modern history of the development 
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of museums is, for Dewey, too thoroughly implicated in the capitalist creation of 
“nouveaux riches” who tend to denigrate art’s potential by exhibiting it not as a 
refined expression of common experience out of which it is born, but rather as a 
refined symbol of their cultural and economic status. “Generally speaking, the 
typical collector is the typical capitalist.”
39
 Art thus gets severed from its place in 
the life of the community and takes on all the accoutrements of acquisitiveness 
and “high” status. Such art become “specimens of fine art and nothing else.”
40
  
It was not that Dewey had an utter distaste for museums. He was, after all, 
gainfully employed for a time at a museum at the Barnes Foundation. What did 
worry Dewey about the museum conception of culture was that it tended to cre-
ate and reinforce “a chasm between ordinary and aesthetic experience.”
41
 As 
Alexander points out, there are two standing and interrelated temptations (not 
inevitabilities) when we participate in the museum’s conception of fineness: 
First we are tempted to isolate our museum experiences from other ex-
periences in life at large. Thus, we fail to see how the works we encounter 
in museums (or their equivalents for other artforms, such as concert 
halls or classrooms) have actually grown from those common conditions 
in life which we share with the artists who made those works. Having 
done this, we may make a second mistake. In believing that aesthetic ex-
perience belongs to a segregated realm, we fail to see how the artists’ suc-
cess in making expressively meaningful, intrinsically fulfilling objects 
from the raw material of life can be applied across the whole spectrum of 
human existence. The great moral to be learned from the arts for Dewey 
is that when ideals cease to be confined to a realm separated from our daily, 
practical experience, they can become powerful forces in teaching us to make 
the materials of our lives filled with meaning.42  
In attempting to steal art back to the commons we may more properly conceive 
of the ways art is potentially expressive and how this expressiveness is vitally 
connected to common life experience.  
Of all modes of human inquiry art most exemplifies the human capacity to 
elevate life’s expressive potential. Our temporal embodiment within nature sig-
nifies life’s rhythmic movement. The very idea, therefore, of order, balance, and 
harmony can make sense only as life’s rhythm is engaged and expressed. The 
more intelligent this engagement and expression, the more life’s artful potential 
is realized. The aesthetic in experience is the result of experience’s differentiation 
out of an otherwise undifferentiated stream of impressions. The aesthetic marks 
an experience as an experience only because “the material experienced runs its 
course to fulfillment.”
43
 Life’s rhythm thus gains consummatory potential as its 
expressive capacity is realized through the organism’s “dynamic organization” of 
the materials at its disposal.
44
 The quality of our growth within life’s rhythmic 
movement is thus a matter of intelligent conduct. Our “undergoing” within this 
rhythm signals us as vulnerable to suffering. We are open to the precariousness 
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that attends and is an integrated part of any rhythmic development. Our “doing” 
signals our ability to channel what we undergo into a newly refined integration. 
Life’s rhythm is thus complemented by the degree of order we are able to estab-
lish with and within our environment. Order itself is developmental. However, 
achieving the aesthetic out of this rhythmic movement is something more than 
just an intellectual achievement. It is the embodied realization of harmony. The 
“material of reflection is incorporated into the objects as their meaning.”
45
 The 
aesthetic thus results from a movement from disturbance to harmony, and that 
moment of harmonization is “that of intensest life.”
46
  
The expressive potential, therefore, of a work of art is realized through this 
rhythmic development, and for this realization to achieve deepened aesthetic 
value and meaning it must inhere in a higher degree of conscious refinement and 
control. This refinement and control is saved from the haphazard only as it is an 
intensified transaction between organism and the encompassing materials of ex-
perience. As Dewey says: “The expressiveness of the object is the report and cele-
bration of the complete fusion of what we undergo and what our activity of atten-
tive perception brings into what we receive by means of the senses.”
47
 Expressive 
art is exemplary of an intensification and amplification of this transactional dy-
namic, and it brings subject and object into refined relation. For Dewey, 
The moments when the creature is both most alive and most composed 
and concentrated are those of fullest intercourse with the environment, 
in which sensuous material and relations are most completely merged. 
Art would not amplify experience if it withdrew the self into the self nor 
would the experience that results from such retirement be expressive.48 
The expressiveness of a work of art is thus exemplary of life’s artful potential as 
levels of aesthetic consummation become realizable by virtue of the spatio-
temporal dynamics that give life its rhythm. However, artworks are not merely 
static achievements. They provide the fuel for enhanced communication and 
thus the social importance of art comes to the fore.  
In Experience and Nature Dewey explicitly makes this point when he says 
that “a genuinely esthetic object is not exclusively consummatory but is causally 
productive as well. A consummatory object that is not also instrumental turns in 
time to the dust and ashes of boredom.”
49
 Staving off this all-too-common ennui 
is art’s power. As I have already highlighted, the power of any aesthetic con-
summation can be fully achieved only as it recognizes the part played by the inef-
fable, the immediate. But life’s art, the fullness of its consummations, is also a 
fullness born out of and into new possibilities. Our temporal status has us con-
stantly “on the go,” so to speak. Being on the go, of course, can be frenetic and 
arbitrary; but this occurs only when “doing” becomes disconnected from “un-
dergoing.” The implications for communication are enormous. When “doing” is 
elevated for its own sake, we tend towards a chaotic and frenetic pace. A cursory 
look at contemporary society shows this all too clearly. However, when “under-
John Dewey: Aesthetic Experience and Artful Conduct ♦ 59 
Volume 21(2) ♦ 2005 
going” is taken up for its own sake, separated from any resultant activity, it tends 
towards mere contemplation and imaginative fancy with no real embodiment in 
action. Dewey reminds us that “[a]n experience has pattern and structure, be-
cause it is not just doing and undergoing in alternation, but consists of them in 
relationship. . . . This relationship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the objec-
tive of all intelligence.”
50
  
It is this relationship that leads also to the fine art of communication. To 
get at communication’s finer potential we need a better understanding of Dewey’s 
instrumentalism, for it is through his instrumental understanding of art that the 
relation of consummation and productivity gains its communicative potential. 
Bringing the instrumental into a discussion of art and aesthetics may seem odd if 
not downright disturbing to those of a strong aesthetic bent. We are accustomed 
to thinking about the instrumental in the strong scientific sense, with its use of 
hard tools for the achievement of narrow ends. Dewey reminds us that “the sci-
ences were born of the arts.”
51
 If art rested only in what immediately is, and 
failed to pay attention to what is made possible out of what is immediately en-
joyed or suffered, art would never have become an “intellectual” achievement. 
For the instrumental in art is its character of intellectual meaning, and as such, 
involves art “in transforming purely immediate qualities of local things into ge-
neric relationships.”
52
 Art as “the greatest intellectual achievement in the history 
of humanity” is singly important to our understanding of science, itself an intel-
lectual achievement of fine art.
53
 It is in this sense that the relation of the con-
summatory and the instrumental is the heartbeat of communication. 
When communication occurs between two or more parties, there is always 
a change to all involved—there are consequences. The communicative effect of 
art is just what it is, an effect. It is not necessarily a moral/instrumental intention 
on the part of the artist. The way art communicates is the effect it has on those 
who partake of it. The art object is thus invariably caught up in its consequences 
for further reflection, communication’s art. When the implications of this are 
taken up within the community at large, we begin to get a sense of art’s vital edu-




The level and style of the arts of literature, poetry, ceremony, amuse-
ment, and recreation which obtain in a community, furnishing the staple 
objects of enjoyment in that community, do more than all else to deter-
mine the current direction of ideas and endeavors in the community. 
They supply the meanings in terms of which life is judged, esteemed, and 
criticized. For an outside spectator, they supply material for a critical 
evaluation of the life led by that community.55  
Because art is at once consummatory and instrumental, its power of communi-
cation resides not only in conveying the mores of a community or culture, but 
also in impelling them imaginatively forward in new directions, toward new rela-
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tionships. Art subtly shapes our experience of the world by educing new possi-
bilities. If it simply conveyed what is customary and familiar, there would be lit-
tle tendency to reflect. The general result would be stasis and the entrenchment 
of dogmatic habit. This is all too prevalent throughout history where rituals of-
ten become entrenched dogma. Rituals themselves can be springboards to 
deeper experience, or death marches toward experiences cut off from and sapped 
of meaning. The power of works of art is that they “are means by which we enter, 
through imagination and the emotions they evoke, into other forms of relation-
ship and participation than our own.”
56
 
Importantly, the language of art is an acquired language, and to the degree 
that the arts of any community or culture fail to flourish, to the degree that they 
are denigrated by any variety of external forces, marks the failure of effective 
education and communication. Life’s art is manifested when, through con-
sciousness of a larger field of meanings and values, we are able to imaginatively 
enter into new experiences. Art sustains conscious activity, “and thereby exhibits, 
so that he who runs may read, the fact that consciousness is not a separate realm 
of being, but is the manifest quality of existence when nature is most free and 
most active.”
57
 The lack of this fuller communication as it now exists between 
nations is steadily becoming an intracultural phenomenon as well. The cultural 
politics so prevalent in today’s societies, more than anything else, speak to the 
erosion of full communication. It is not that cultural sub-divisions are inherently 
bad, but if these divisions are not informed by fuller communication, that is, by 
a consciousness of the larger field of meanings and values flowing within the cul-
ture at large, then a corrosive isolationist tendency develops. Under such condi-
tions there is a marked disposition toward impulsive brutality as a way of dealing 
with experience’s emptiness brought on by the inability to artfully communicate. 
These are deadening divisions, but add conscious and conscientious communi-
cation, and deadening divisions might be transformed into productive distinc-
tions. Life’s art becomes more fully realized under these conditions. Dewey ex-
tends art’s full potential when he states that 
Instruction in the arts of life is something other than conveying informa-
tion about them. It is a matter of communication and participation in 
values of life by means of the imagination, and works of art are the most 
intimate and energetic means of aiding individuals to share in the arts of 
living. Civilization is uncivil because human beings are divided into non-
communicating sects, races, nations, classes and cliques.58  
We see the structure of another stale division begin to crumble—that between 
the individual and the social.  
Dewey clears the path for a more pragmatic exploration of our political 
experiences. This becomes even more pressing in our contemporary global soci-
ety where it is not just a matter of “non-communicating sects, races, nations, 
classes and cliques,” but rather the proliferation of insidious, noncritical forms of 
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communication that are successfully uniting masses of people with superficial 
consummations. Dewey’s notion of artful experience, I think, shoulders well the 
burden of our most profound personal and social experiences. Needless to say, 
artful conduct is not easy in today’s world, but with Dewey’s complex and de-
tailed reworking of the philosophical tradition, I think we have something that 
we have not seen a great deal of since Dewey’s time—a working philosophy. 
Dewey offers us something to go on, and what he offers might perhaps be an im-
portant key to our survival. 
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